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I. INTRODUCTION

Gill v. Gill should have been a standard case about classifying, valuing,
and distributing marital property during a marriage dissolution. Instead, Gill
1

developed into an authoritative case that usurped legislative authority and
created new precedent. Creating new precedent was unnecessary because
there was ample discretion provided in the governing statutes to obtain a just
and equitable distribution. 2 Further, the new precedent is undesirable
because it takes away the flexibility and certainty of the governing statutes,
while proliferating gender and role-based disparities that the legislature has
purposefully tried to eliminate. 3

A. Factual Background
Stephen Gill (“Stephen”) and Gretchen Gill (“Gretchen”) were
married in 1993. 4 During their marriage, the couple decided the optimal
course for their family was for Stephen to pursue his career while Gretchen
focused her efforts on raising the couple’s children and providing
background support to her husband while he developed and increased his
earning capacity. 5 This arrangement worked well for the couple. With
Gretchen’s support, Stephen was able to acquire Talenti, a Gelato
company. 6 Under his leadership, the company thrived and became a
multimillion-dollar asset. 7

*Wendy Cicotte is a second-year student in Mitchell Hamline's Executive J.D. program,
anticipating graduation in May 2022. She holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Brigham
Young University-Idaho. She is working to become an advocate for policies supporting
traditional families and the free exercise of religion.
919 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. 2018).
MINN. STAT. §§ 518.003, 518.58 (2019); see also infra Section IV.D.4.
See infra Part II.
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 298.
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and
Decree at 8, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8,
2016).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 10.
1
2
3
4
5

6
7
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After nearly twenty-one years of marriage, Stephen filed for a marital
dissolution in August 2014. 8 Pursuant to Minnesota statute, 9 the Gills’
ownership in Talenti was classified as marital property and valued at their
marriage dissolution’s valuation date. 10 However, shortly after the valuation,
but before the Gill’s dissolution was final, the company sold for a $180
million up-front payment with two subsequent earn-out payments that
would be calculated on future growth. 11 The sale amount was significantly
more than the company’s valuation just two months prior. 12
Gretchen petitioned the court to classify the proceeds from the sale of
Talenti, including the earn-out payments, as marital property and award her
an equitable portion. 13 To address the situation, the Gill court had to
determine whether the proceeds from Talenti’s sale were marital or
nonmarital property, and if so, whether the earn-out payments were part of
the proceeds. 14
The district court applied the law rigidly and held the sale occurred
after the valuation date, so proceeds were not marital property. 15 The court
further stated, in dictum, that “earn-outs, if obtained, will be a result of
Husband’s significant post-marital labor and should be awarded to him as
nonmarital property.” 16
Gretchen appealed the district court’s decision to the Minnesota Court
of Appeals. 17 The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s
award based on contract interpretation, holding that “the purchase
agreement unambiguously provided that the purchaser of [Talenti] was
willing to pay $180 million, plus two earn-out payments . . . regardless of
8

Gill, 919 N.W.2d. at 300.

MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019) (“The court shall value marital assets for purposes
of division between the parties as of the day of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement
conference.”).
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 309 (valuing Talenti at $180 million).
Id. at 298.
Compare id. (valuing Talenti at $180 million at valuation date), with id. at 309 (stating sale
price after valuation date, but before dissolution, as a $180 million up-front payment with
two potential future earn-out payments that could range from $0 to $170 million in value).
Gill v. Gill, 900 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
Id.; see also Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301.
MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3(b) (2019) (“‘Nonmarital property’ means property real
or personal, acquired by either spouse before, during, or after the existence of their marriage,
which . . . (d) is acquired by a spouse after the valuation date . . . .”); Gill, 919 N.W.2d at
301.
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and
Decree at 16, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8,
2016).
See Gill, 900 N.W.2d 717.
9
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13
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whether a seller continued work for the purchaser. Because the earn-outs
payments were part of the purchase price for [Talenti], they reflect
[Talenti’s] value as of the [valuation date].” 18
Stephen appealed the decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court. 19
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the Minnesota Court of Appeals’
holding that “because the parties’ interest in the company was marital
property that was acquired before the valuation date, the consideration for
the sale of the company, which occurred before the dissolution and
included an amount paid at the time of the sale and a contractual right to
receive future amounts, is also marital property.” 20
However, the dissent in Gill rightly pointed out that the majority, in
reaching its decision to classify earn-out payments as marital property,
required “considerable legal gymnastics which include[d] disregarding the
district court’s factual findings, ignoring the valuation date, [and] rewriting
the statutory definition of ‘marital property.’” 21

B. Summary of Analysis
Minnesota’s law governing property distribution in a marriage
dissolution was purposely crafted to eliminate gender bias and generate
certainty through an established valuation date while still affording a high
degree of flexibility to render a just and equitable distribution through
judicial discretion. 22 The new precedent ignores the legislature’s purposeful
balancing and instead adopts a new inflexible rule: that all proceeds from
the sale of marital property before dissolution constitute marital property as
a matter of law. 23
This note analyzes in detail the challenges caused by Gill. Challenges
include: (1) equitable distribution requires discretion which the statute
provides and Gill takes away; (2) Gill’s attempt at a strict rule creates
uncertainty; (3) new precedent was unnecessary because a just and equitable
outcome could have been accomplished within the confines of the existing
law; (4) Gill proliferates the power imbalance that often accompanies a
traditional marital relationship where one spouse, traditionally the wife,
gives up her earning potential to stay home and raise the couple’s children

18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at 719.
See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 308 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
MINN. Stat. §§ 518.003, 518.58 (2019); see also infra Part II.
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 298; see also id. at 308 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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and support her husband; and (5) Gill facilitates post-Gill planning for
distribution of marital assets that game the system. 24
This case note begins with a history of the statutes and cases that
regulate how Minnesota classifies and divides property in a marriage
dissolution. 25 This is followed by the facts of Gill v. Gill and an in-depth
procedural history. 26 Ultimately, this case note posits that in all the stages of
litigation, none of the courts reached a fully reasoned conclusion within the
confines of the law on the valuation of marital property. 27
As a result, in deciding Gill, the Minnesota Supreme Court created
new precedent that could engender unfair property distribution in the future
because it does not allow judicial discretion and instead reinforces negative
gender stereotypes that may create unfairness in the dissolution of
traditional marriages. 28
II. HISTORY

A. Just and Equitable Property Distribution
Minnesota—like most states—adheres to the concept of equitable
distribution. 29 As early as 1951, section 518 of the Minnesota statutes
regulated how marital property should be classified and divided in a
marriage dissolution to achieve equitable distribution. 30
Initially, the statute gave the court absolute discretion to make a
“disposition” of property that was “just and equitable.” 31 The statute listed
six discretionary factors for consideration by the court when making the
disposition, but many of the factors had a focus that favored the
24
25
26
27
28
29

See infra Section IV.E.–F.
See MINN. STAT. § 518.003 (2019); see also MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (2019).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Section IV.F.
Compare Equitable Distribution, BLACKʼS LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The

division of marital property by a court in a divorce proceeding, under statutory guidelines
that provide for a fair, but not necessarily equal, allocation of the property between the
spouses.”) with Community Property, BLACKʼS LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Assets
owned in common by husband and wife as a result of their having been acquired during the
marriage by means other than an inheritance by, or a gift or devise to, one spouse, each
spouse generally holding a one-half interest in the property. Only nine states have
community-property systems: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. A community-property regime is elective in Alaska.”).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, sec. 5 (1951).
Id. (“Upon a divorce for any cause . . . the court may make such disposition of the property
of the parties acquired during coverture as shall appear just and equitable.”) (emphasis
added).
30
31
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breadwinner’s financial contributions and were often to the homemaker’s
detriment. 32 Generally, during this period, the breadwinner was a man, and
the homemaker was most often a woman. The statute also contained explicit
gender discrimination through continued use of the centuries-old term
“coverture.” 33 Under coverture, a married man and a woman were treated
by the State as a single, male-dominated legal entity. 34
Additionally, there was implicit discrimination throughout the statute
because it did not explicitly eliminate discrimination by referencing both
spouses or including additional factors to safeguard against society’s
traditional expectation that the woman gives up career and financial
opportunity to stay home and care for the home and family. 35 For example,
property disposition depended on how it was acquired. 36 In this period,
property would most often be acquired solely from the husband’s earnings
because the majority of married women were not in the workforce. 37
Likewise, the court was urged to look at who was paying or supplying the
consideration for the property. 38 Again, the husband was most likely to be
the spouse paying or supplying the consideration for the property due to the
traditional roles spouses held in society at this time. 39

Id. (limiting the court’s discretion to six factors: (1) a regard to the nature and determination
of the issues in the case; (2) the amount of alimony or support money; (3) the manner by
which said property was acquired; (4) the persons paying or supplying the consideration for
the property; (5) the charges or liens imposed upon the property to secure payment of
alimony or support money; and (6) all the facts and circumstances of the case).
Id. (“Upon a divorce for any cause, or upon an annulment, the court may make such
disposition of the property of the parties acquired during coverture as shall appear just and
equitable . . . .”).
Id.; see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *430
(1765).
Compare MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1978) (adding language applying discretionary factors to
“each party” and “each spouse”), with MINN. STAT. § 518.58, Sec. 5 (1951) (containing no
language that shows application of the discretionary factors to both spouses or parties).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, sec. 5 (1951).
Changes in Women’s Labor Force Participation in the 20th Century, BLS.GOV (Feb. 16,
2000), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2000/feb/wk3/art03.htm [https://perma.cc/4WPLHSFG] (showing about one in three women participated in the labor force in 1950, and of
those, a greater percentage were women age 16 to 24).
MINN. STAT. §518.58, sec. 5 (1951) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1
(2019)).
Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with
Dolls, Partnership Buyouts, and Dissociation under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67, 70
(1993) (“Startling inequities have resulted, as judges ignore the realities of scant property and
limited earning potential and adopt the legislative assumption that homemakers need
minimal, if any, maintenance.”).
32

33

34

35

36
37

38

39
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In the ensuing twenty-five years, the legislature recognized the statute’s
discrimination and unfair prejudice and slowly began the process of
eliminating bias by updating key terminology and adding language to
accomplish its goal of obtaining a just and equitable result. 40 In 1978, the
legislature replaced “coverture” with “marriage” and replaced the
discretionary language—“may make . . . disposition of the property . . . as
shall appear just and equitable,”—with the explicit language that the court
“shall . . . make a just and equitable disposition of the marital property.” 41
Nonetheless, even with the explicit instruction to make a just and
equitable disposition, the legislature still allowed the court considerable
discretion in how to implement its intent. 42 There were still concrete
discretionary factors to consider, though the list was significantly changed to
eliminate favoritism for the breadwinner and create a way to fairly assess the
needs of both spouses with gender-neutral factors. 43 For example, two new
factors—age and health—applied equally to both spouses and genders. The
additional factors of employability and vocational skills look to counter the
homemaker’s sacrifice, regardless of whether the homemaker is a man or a
woman. 44
The new assessment was a charge to consider “all relevant factors,” but
the new list was by no means exhaustive. 45 The court’s latitude of discretion
even extended to an award of up to one-half of the nonmarital property
based on extreme hardship. 46
Id. Starnes advocates divorce law reform as “an immediate response that will both ease
current suffering and encourage future relaxation of gender roles.” Id. at 9.
Compare MINN. STAT. § 518.58, sec. 5 (1951), with MINN. STAT. §518.58 (1978)
(emphasis added).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, sec. 5 (1978).
Id. (replacing the factors from 1951 with sixteen gender neutral factors: (1) the length of
the marriage; (2) any prior marriages of a party; (3) age; (4) health; (5) station; (6) occupation;
(7) amount and sources of income; (8) vocational skills; (9) employability; (10) estate; (11)
liabilities; (12) needs; (13) opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets; (14) amount of
support, maintenance and income of each party; (15) whether the property award is in lieu
of or in addition to maintenance or support; (16) the contribution, or dissipation of each
spouse in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation in value of the respective
estates; and (17) the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker).
See Starnes, supra note 39, at 119 (“The ‘ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal
partnerships between spouses who share resources, responsibilities, and risksʼ and thus
perhaps some limited duty to sacrifice for the good of the partnership.”).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, sec. 5 (1978) (“The court shall base its findings on all relevant
factors including [all the factors listed in supra note 43].”) (emphasis added).
Id. (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019)) (“If the court finds that
either spouse’s resources or property, including his portion of the marital property . . . are
so inadequate as to work an extreme hardship, the court may, in addition to the marital
40

41

42
43

44

45

46
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B. Just and Equitable Property Distribution for All
Most importantly, the 1978 amendment acknowledged the significant
contributions a homemaker brings to a marriage by openly charging the
court to consider the “contribution of a spouse as a homemaker” 47 and
mandating a presumption “that each spouse made a substantial contribution
to the acquisition of income and property while they were living together as
husband and wife.” 48 This mandated consideration evinced an increased
awareness that many marriages share all property and income while focusing
the wife’s efforts on maintaining the home and family and building the
husband’s career and earning power. 49 The legislature and the court
recognized that marriages are dependent on several components, only one
of which is financial. 50 Therefore, a spouse’s contribution could no longer
be measured solely by the amount of money he or she contributed;
nonfinancial components also needed to be measured to facilitate just and
equitable property division. 51
Fine-tuning of the statute continued in 1979 when the legislature
changed the primary consideration for awarding nonmarital property from
one of “extreme hardship” to a consideration of “unfair hardship” and
added an examination of “all relevant circumstances” in doing so. 52 In 1982,
the legislature returned to the homemaker provision and added one word—
“conclusively.” 53 The statute now read, “It shall be conclusively presumed
that each spouse made a substantial contribution to the acquisition of
income and property while they were living together as husband and wife.” 54
This one-word addition heightened the importance of the homemaker’s
role from one that presumed the homemaker had a high probability of
property, apportion up to one-half of the property otherwise excluded [as nonmarital
property] . . . to prevent the hardship.”).
Id. (“The court shall also consider the contribution or dissipation of each in the acquisition,
preservation, depreciation or appreciation in value of the respective estates, as well as the
contribution of a spouse as a homemaker.”).
Id.
See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences
of Property, Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181 (1981) (discussing
California’s no-fault divorce law and the major shifts in legal processes of divorce).
See Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987) (recognizing that the increase
in the value of a business acquired prior to the marriage is due to the efforts of both spouses,
including the wife’s nonfinancial contributions to the home life that allowed the husband to
focus on growing the family business).
Id.
MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1979).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1982).
Id. (emphasis added).
47

48
49

50

51
52
53
54
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making a substantial contribution to a conclusive presumption that “cannot
be overcome by any additional evidence or argument because it is accepted
as irrefutable proof that establishes the fact beyond dispute.” 55 Moreover,
the addition solidified the legislature’s intent to make a just and equitable
distribution by financially protecting the homemaker who had sacrificed his
or her own income and earning potential for the greater good of the family.
This alleviated some of the pressures a financially vulnerable homemaker
might feel to seek a financial safety net by abandoning the vital homemaker
role and entering the workforce. 56
Finally, throughout the statute, the legislature changed the word
“disposition” to “division.” 57 “Disposition of property” references property
owned by one individual that is transferred to another, 58 while “division of
property” references property that is owned together and subsequently
divided among the owners. 59 This momentous change reinforced the
legislature’s “conclusive presumption that each spouse made a substantial
contribution to the acquisition of income and property while they were living
together as husband and wife,” regardless of whether one spouse was a
homemaker who did not, during the period of the marriage, utilize his or
her earning potential. 60 Marital property was no longer the breadwinner’s to
be transferred as the court deemed fair. Instead, marital property was
property that rightfully belonged to both spouses based on their distinct, yet
equally valuable, contributions to the marriage. 61

55
56

Conclusive presumption, BLACKʼS LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
See Starnes, supra note 39, at 69, stating:

Wifely submission is risky business . . . . Gone is the day when a wife could
depend on her husband’s labor to maintain her at home, ‘secure and safe.ʼ
Today is the day of divorce at will and equality rhetoric, which means that if her
marriage ends, the homemaking wife will be catapulted into financial
independence, and probably financial ruin.
MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1982).
Disposition, BLACKʼS LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
Equitable Division, BLACKʼS LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“With equitable
distribution, when a marriage ends in divorce, property acquired during the marriage is
divided equitably between the spouses regardless of who holds title to the property.”).
See MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1982).
See Quick v. Quick, 381 N.W.2d 5, 7–8 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (acknowledging the
husband was the primary wage earner, but the wife’s contribution as a homemaker and the
twenty-year marriage of the parties justified the equal division of property in the parties’
dissolution action).
57
58
59

60
61
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C. Just and Equitable Valuation of Property
Part of a court’s responsibility to make a just and equitable division of
property involves the challenging issue of assigning a fair value to property
in a timely manner. In 1979, the legislature gave courts authority to reassess
a property’s value up to thirty months after a dissolution:
[W]hen one party is awarded the homestead and the other party
is awarded a fixed dollar amount based on an assumed or
appraised market value of the homestead and within 24 months
following the decree the homestead is sold, within six months of
the sale either party may petition, and the court may grant, an
apportionment of the proceeds in the proportion award in the
decree, based upon the net sale price rather than the assumed or
appraised market value. 62
The thirty-month post-dissolution window created too much
uncertainty and was quickly discarded in 1981. 63 The legislature’s solution
to this uncertainty was a statutory provision allowing the court to force the
sale of the homestead or other marital assets during the pendency of
marriage dissolution if the circumstances required it. 64
The next important statutory revision for purposes of this case note
occurred in 1988. 65 Historically, marital property included any property that
was acquired during the existence of the marriage but prior to the date of
dissolution. 66 However, in 1988, the legislature changed the language
defining “nonmarital property” and established a new cutoff date for
classifying and valuing marital property—the valuation date. 67 Any property
MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1979) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019)).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58 (1981).
Id. (“If the court finds that it is necessary to preserve the marital assets of the parties, the
court may order the sale of the homestead of the parties or the sale of other marital assets,
as the individual circumstances may require, during the pendency of the proceeding for a
dissolution of marriage or an annulment.”).
Compare MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (1988), with MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1
(1982) (clarifying when marital property vests).
MINN. STAT. § 518.54, subdiv. 5 (1951) (current version at Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subdiv.
3b (2019)) (“‘Property acquired during covertureʼ means any property, real or personal,
acquired by the parties . . . to a divorce . . . at any time during the marriage relation between
them . . . .”).
MINN. STAT. § 518.54, subdiv. 5 (1988) (“‘Nonmarital propertyʼ means property real or
personal, acquired by either spouse before, during, or after the existence of their marriage,
which . . . is acquired by a spouse after the valuation date.”); MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv.
1 (1988) (“The court shall value marital assets for purposes of division between the parties
as of the day of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement conference, unless a different
date is agreed upon by the parties, or unless the court makes specific findings that another
date of valuation is fair and equitable.”).
62
63
64

65

66

67
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acquired after the valuation date, regardless of a later dissolution date, was
presumed to be nonmarital property. 68 However, the legislature built in
court discretion by adding that “if there is a substantial change in value of an
asset between the date of the valuation and the final distribution, the court
may adjust the valuation of that asset as necessary to effect an equitable
distribution.” 69
The valuation date was originally the day the proceedings for
dissolution commenced. 70 But in 1989, the legislature clarified that the
valuation date was the date of the initially scheduled prehearing settlement
conference, or, if agreed upon by the parties, another date that was deemed
fair and equitable. 71 An early valuation date, such as Minnesota’s, serves to
protect both spouses. 72 For example, a spouse who controls and manages a
business is protected in the event the value of that business increases
between the pretrial hearing and trial date due to the individual efforts of
the managing spouse. 73 It confers the benefits of his or her labor.
Conversely, it also protects the non-managing spouse. Should the spouse
who controls and manages the business decide to run the business into the
ground, the non-managing spouse will not suffer any loss as a result of the
managing spouse’s actions. 74
Choosing a valuation date is one of the most challenging problems
created by the equitable distribution law and yet is of utmost importance. 75
MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3b(d) (2019); see also Rohling v. Rohling, 379 N.W.2d
519, 522 (Minn. 1986) (finding future retirement funds were marital property because
respondent acquired the right to receive retirement funds under the plan during the period
in which he was employed and married).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (1988) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv.
1 (2019)).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (1989).

68

69

70

Id.
See Lynn Weddle Judkins, Comment, The Road to Splitsville: How the Timing of
Valuation During Marital Dissolution Leads to Costly Detours, 15 J. AM. ACAD.

71
72

MATRIMONIAL L. 465 (1998).
Id. at 475–76.
Id. at 474–75, stating:
Practitioners may also argue that the court should employ this valuation date in
special, time-is-of-the-essence-type situations, especially ‘where there is evidence
that a marital asset was dissipated, wasted, or converted to a non-marital form.’
This quick alternative protects a spouse from another’s squandering of marital
assets and allows the protected spouse to retain more resources to start a new
life.
(quoting Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 918 n.5 (Alaska 1994)).
Id. at 470–71 (quoting Sutliff v. Sutliff, 543 A.2d 534, 537 (Pa. 1988)) (“[T]he practical
effect of this procedure may make a difference in the amount of marital property awarded
and prevent a potential decrease in the clients standard of living [because] ‘value is by no
73
74

75
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In complex divorces, protracted pretrial proceedings and other calendar
delays often produce a significant interval between the commencement of
an action and the time of trial. 76 During the interim, property values likely
do not remain constant. 77 Minnesota’s legislature recognized this
conundrum and sought to alleviate its unjust ramifications by implementing
an early valuation date at the date of the pretrial settlement conference,
augmented with judicial discretion. 78

D. Contradictions Between the Legislature’s Intent and Defining
Precedent
Each amendment to the statue’s language was explicitly implemented
to offset a negative imbalance that the prior version of the statute
inadvertently created. 79 These imbalances became evident as cases made
their way through the courts and showed the statute’s imperfections. 80 As
courts resolved the issues that surfaced when parties attempted to comply
with or avoid the statute, courts created defining precedent to which the
legislature responded accordingly with a series of amendments to reconcile
the law with reality. 81
means a constant.ʼ Indeed, what appears just at a particular valuation date may not have an
equitable effect down the road.”); see also Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Proper Date for
Valuation of Property Being Distributed Pursuant to Divorce, 34 A.L.R.4th 63 (2019).
Judkins, supra note 72, at 475 (“[D]ivorce trial occurs after filing the initial pleading,
comprehensive financial discovery, and presentation of all evidence supporting one’s
position.”).
Id. at 474 (“One must also caution practitioners about the effect of early valuation dates on
increases in marital assets, like stock plans, securities, or business partnerships. Property
value may rise . . . .”).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (1989).
For a brief discussion of legislative drafting, see HOLC Guide to Legislative Drafting,
OFFICE
OF
THE
LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL,
https://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Drafting_Legislation/Drafting_Guide.html#VII
[https://perma.cc/RT2Q-Z9CZ].
See, e.g., Grigsby v. Grigsby, 648 N.W.2d 716, 722–723 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
when the benefits of an employment-separation agreement are acquired after the valuation
date, but are related to employment performed during marriage, the benefits are marital
property); Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987) (holding the trial court
abused its discretion when it divided the family business without taking into account the wife’s
contributions to the business and solely considered the husband’s pre-marriage purchase of
a business interest); Miller v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 738, 742–743 (Minn. 1984) (finding the
wife played a substantial role in amassing the marital estate even though the acquisition,
preservation, and appreciation of the marital property was primarily attributable to the
husband).
See, e.g., Danielson v. Danielson, 392 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(maintaining the trial court’s decision should be reversed only for an abuse of discretion);
76

77

78
79

80

81
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Gill is the latest in the court’s long line of precedent. The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gill overruled precedent and ignored the
82

statute’s carefully crafted text by classifying property acquired after the
valuation date as marital property. 83 As noted, the legislature included ample
room for judicial discretion to consider all relevant factors in reaching a just
and equitable division of property. Within the confines of that judicial
discretion, the Gill court could have reached the same conclusion resulting
in a just and equitable division of the Gills’ property, but, instead, the court
chose to carve a new path outside the confines of the law. 84 This new
precedent, even if unintended, could lead to future outcomes that
undermine the legislature’s intent to make a just and equitable division of
property.
III. THE GILL DECISION

A. Facts
Both Appellant Stephen and Respondent Gretchen were employed
when they were married in 1993. 85 Stephen was the President of Phillips
Beverage Company, and Gretchen worked full time selling cable television
advertising. 86 The parties’ roles during the marriage were very traditional—
Stephen was the breadwinner, and Gretchen was the stay-at-home mother
and wife. 87 After the birth of the couple’s first child in 1994, Gretchen gave
up her career to stay home and raise the parties’ four children. 88 Meanwhile,
Stephen continued to work and advance his earning ability at the Phillips
Beverage Company. 89
During Stephen and Gretchen’s marriage, Stephen purchased an
ownership interest in Talenti, a gelato company. In 2008, Stephen and his
former boss, Eddie Phillips, went in as equal partners and bought a little
Rohling v. Rohling, 379 N.W.2d 519, 522 (Minn. 1986) (stating the appellate court must
affirm the district court’s decision if it has an acceptable basis in fact and principle even
though the appellate court might have come to a different conclusion).
Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (Minn. 2018).
Id. at 298, 311 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 311.
Id. at 298.
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id.
Id.
Id. at 298–99.
See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment

and Decree at 4, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr.
8, 2016). At the time of dissolution, Stephen was the Chief Executive Officer of Talenti,
making a gross annual salary of $362,500 per year.
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over 50% of Talenti for approximately $1.5 million. 90 After purchasing
Talenti, Stephen became its Chief Executive Officer (CEO). 91 Stephen’s
involvement and leadership were significant contributors to Talenti’s growth
and success. 92 Following Stephen’s purchase of Talenti, Stephen formed a
limited liability company, Wyndmere, LLC (“Wyndmere”), to hold the
parties’ interest in Talenti. 93 The five named owners of Wyndmere are
Stephen and the parties’ four children. 94 Sometime after Wyndmere’s
creation, Wyndmere acquired a membership interest in Talenti’s parent
company, David Goliath Group, LLC (DGG). 95
Other members of the Talenti team were added over the ensuing
years, and some purchased an interest in the company. Additionally, in
2011, Eddie Phillips died, and his interest passed to his sons, Dean and
Tyler Phillips. 96 Dean subsequently joined the team, but Tyler did not. 97 The
following chart shows the members, individual owners, and ownership
percentage of DGG: 98
DAVID GOLIATH GROUP, LLC
MEMBER
INDIVIDUAL
OWNER
Fialko, LLC
Dean B. Phillips
Tyler J. Phillips
Dean
B.
Phillips
Revocable Trust u/a/d
February 26, 1993
Tyler
J.
Phillips
Revocable Trust u/a/d
April 27, 1994
Wyndmere, LLC
F. Stephen Gill
Gill Family Irrevocable
Trust FBO Chandler
Susan
Gill
u/a/d
February 14, 2011
Gill Family Irrevocable
Trust
FBO
Paige
Madison Gill u/a/d
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 11.

OWNERSHIP
PERCENTAGE
38.7043%

38.7043%
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Hochschuler, LLC
The Majody Helms,
LLC
Kent Pilakowski

February 14, 2011
Gill Family Irrevocable
Trust FBO McKenzie
Elizabeth Gill u/a/d
February 14, 2011
Gill Family Irrevocable
Trust FBO Taylor
Francis
Gill
u/a/d
February 14, 2011
Joshua Hochschuler
Carole Silverman
Jack P. Helms
Kent Pilakowski

[Vol. 46:3

18.2914%
3.3000%
1.000%

Even though Gretchen is not listed as an owner of DGG, it was not
disputed that she had marital ownership in both Wyndmere and David
Goliath because both were acquired during the parties’ marriage. 99 In 2013,
DGG decided to sell Talenti and began negotiations with Unilever N.V. and
Conopco Inc. (collectively, “Unilever”). 100 Negotiations continued for
approximately one year, culminating in a letter of intent signed in July
2014. 101 The sale terms set out in the letter of intent were consistent with the
final purchase agreement, wherein the purchase price was split between a
$180 million upfront payment and two future, contingent earn-out payments
worth up to $170 million. 102 Each member had a right to receive their
percentage of the earn-out payments, regardless of whether they worked for
Talenti after the sale. 103

B. Procedural History
Stephen petitioned for a dissolution of his marriage to Gretchen in
August 2014. 104 The district court set the dissolution’s valuation date for
September 5, 2014, 105 before the purchase agreement for Talenti’s sale was

See Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 299 (Minn. 2018); see also MINN. STAT. § 518.003,
subdiv. 3b (2016) (“‘Marital propertyʼ means property . . . acquired by the parties, or either
of them . . . at any time during the existence of the marriage relation between them . . . but
prior to the date of valuation . . . .”).
Gill, 919 N.W.2d. at 299.

99

100
101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 299.
Id.
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executed on December 2, 2014. 106 At the valuation hearing, the court valued
Talenti at $180 million based on the up-front sale price in the letter of intent,
which the court determined was the “present value” of the business. 107 The
court also found that the value was consistent with other acquisitions of
similarly-situated frozen dessert companies. 108 However, when the court
valued Talenti, it did not consider the earn-out payments that were also
referenced in the letter of intent. 109
The Talenti sale closed on December 2, 2014, after the valuation date
but before the final dissolution of the parties’ marriage. 110 The purchase
agreement was consistent with the terms in the July letter of intent and
consisted of a $180 million upfront payment, followed by the two earn-out
payments that were dependent upon Talenti’s performance during the
following two years. 111 The purchase agreement specified a formula for
calculating the earn-out payments, which could potentially total $170
million. 112 When the earn-out payments were realized, they would be
available to all members. 113
The contract language provided:
SECTION 1.01. The Asset Purchase. . . . (b) As additional
consideration for the Assets, the Company shall also be eligible
to receive from Asset Buyer (i) an amount equal to the First Earnout Payment . . . and (ii) an amount equal to the Second Earn-out
Payment . . . .
SECTION 1.02. The Distribution. . . . [I]mmediately following
the consummation of the Asset Purchase, [David Goliath] shall
effect a distribution to the Members of (a) the Asset Purchase
Payment and (b) the right to receive (i) an amount equal to the
First Earn-out Payment . . . and (ii) an amount equal to the
Second Earn-out Payment . . . .
SECTION 1.03. The Membership Unit Purchase. . . . (b) As
additional consideration for the Membership Units, the
Members shall also be eligible to receive from Unit Buyer (i) an

106
107
108

Id.
Id. at 309 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment

and Decree at 10, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr.
8, 2016).
Id. at 30.
Gill, 919 N.W.2d. at 299 n.4.
Id. at 299–300.
Id. at 300.
109
110
111
112
113

Id.
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amount equal to the First Earn-out Payment . . . and (ii) an
amount equal to the Second Earn-out Payment . . . . 114
The non-working members included: Eddie Phillips’ son, Tyler
Phillips; Josh Hochschuler’s mother, Carole Silverman; and the Gill’s four
daughters, Taylor, McKenzie, Paige, and Chandler. 115 In addition, Stephen
negotiated a separate, two-year employment contract with Unilever,
agreeing to be Talenti’s CEO for a salary of $362,500 in the first year and
$375,625 the next. 116
The dissolution of Stephen and Gretchen’s marriage was final on
January 4, 2016, only one month after the sale of Talenti. 117 Shortly after,
Gretchen challenged the district court’s classification of the earn-out
payments as nonmarital property. 118 To rule on Gretchen’s post-trial motion,
the district court looked to the plain language of section 518.003,
subdivision 3b, of the Minnesota Statutes 119 and determined that the earnout payments were nonmarital property because they were acquired by
Stephen after the valuation date and were compensation for work Stephen
would do in the future. 120 According to the district court, Gretchen was only
entitled to her marital share of Talenti as it was assessed on the valuation
date. 121
Gretchen appealed the district court’s decision, and the Minnesota
Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that contract interpretation governed
the classification of earn-out payments as marital or nonmarital property. 122
The Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the sale’s contract branded
both the upfront payment and the future earn-out payments as
“consideration,” and, therefore, the earn-out payments were not
compensation but part of the sale price. 123 Therefore, the earn-out payments
were marital property and Stephen’s share should have been divided
accordingly. 124
114
115
116
117
118

Id.
See id. at 298–99.
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 301.

MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3d(b) (2016) (“‘Nonmarital propertyʼ means property real
or personal, acquired by either spouse before, during, or after the existence of their marriage,
which . . . is acquired by a spouse after the valuation date.”).
See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment
and Decree at 16, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr.
8, 2016).
Gill, 919 N.W.2d. at 309 (Anderson J., dissenting).
Gill v. Gill, 900 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
Id. at 720–21.
119

120

121
122
123
124

Id.
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Stephen appealed, but upon review, the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed the court of appeals and remanded the case back to the district
court to value and equitably divide Stephen’s portion of the earn-out
payments with Gretchen. 125 The court concluded that “[a] sale of marital
property during dissolution proceedings, regardless of when that sale
occurs, results in the proceeds from the sale also being marital property, the
value of which is defined by the contract selling that asset.” 126
Additionally, the court affirmed the Minnesota Court of Appeals’
determination that the earn-out payments were a contractual right from the
sale of a marital asset that was acquired before the valuation date, subject to
the court’s valuation and equitable division. 127 Further, the earn-out
payments were not compensation for work Stephen would do in the future
because every DGG member was entitled to share in the payments,
regardless of future employment with the company. 128
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision, however, was not
unanimous. The dissent argued that the original district court holding
should stand and noted that the district court set new, unnecessary
precedent that was undesirable because it did not utilize appropriate
standards of review, did not apply the law as written, and took away the
flexibility of the statute’s judicial discretion. 129 By doing so, the majority
undermined the legislature’s intent to protect the homemaker and eliminate
gender and role bias in a marriage dissolution. 130
IV. ANALYSIS
In Minnesota, when dividing property in a marriage dissolution, a
court’s primary charge is to make the division just and equitable. 131 Yet, when
the district court denied Gretchen Gill a portion of the earn-out payments
from Talenti’s sale, it was neither just, nor equitable. 132 The Minnesota
Supreme Court recognized the district court’s failure to fulfill its charge and
attempted to remedy it. 133 In one respect, the Minnesota Supreme Court
succeeded—it made a just and equitable division. But in other respects, it
125
126
127
128
129
130

Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 307 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 303–04.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
See id. at 308 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
See supra Part II.

MINN. STAT. §518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019).
See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment
and Decree at 16, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr.
8, 2016).
See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 308.
131
132

133
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failed because it needlessly created new precedent that overrode the
legislature’s purposeful establishment of a valuation date and moved away
from judicial discretion that allowed the court to protect homemakers like
Gretchen Gill. 134
The same just and equitable result could have been attained
completely within the confines of the law, using appropriate standards of
review. 135 A thorough analysis of the standards of review at each judicial stage
of Gill will illustrate how a just and equitable result could have been reached
at any stage and why new precedent was unnecessary.

A. Minnesota Standards of Review
Minnesota has adopted basic standards of review that must be applied
when reviewing findings of fact and questions of law, including contract and
statutory interpretation. 136 These standards of review merit some discussion
because they limited the ways the reviewing courts in Gill could overturn the
district court’s decision. 137

1. Findings of Fact
There are two kinds of findings of fact: oral and documentary. The
legislature does not differentiate between the two. 138 Deference to the lower
court is required when reviewing findings of fact. Under Minnesota Rules
of Civil Procedure, findings of fact cannot be set aside unless clearly
erroneous. 139 A district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error
to see if there is reasonable evidence in the record to support the court’s
findings. 140 Even if there is reasonable evidence to support a finding of fact,
the finding can still be clearly erroneous if the reviewing court, on the entire
evidence, is “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed.” 141 When determining whether a finding of fact is clearly
134
135
136

See infra Section IV.D.
See infra Section IV.D.
See The Minnesota Court of Appeals Standards of Review, MNCOURTS.GOV (Aug. 2019),

http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/Appellate/Court%20of%20Appeals/Standard
s-of-Review.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4DH-FF8T].
137

Id.

Tarr v. Tarr, No. C9-93-2216, 1994 WL 91203, at *3 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 1994)
(stating that the 1985 amendment to Rule 52.01 overruled In re Trust Known as Great
Northern Iron Ore Properties, 243 N.W.2d 302 (1976), and the clearly erroneous standard
now governs findings based on documentary as well as oral evidence).
MINN. R. CIV. P. 52.01 (2019).
Rasmussen v. Two Harbors Fish Co., 832 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. 2013).
Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997) (citing In re Trust Known as Great
Northern Iron Ore Properties, 308 Minn. 221, 224, 243 N.W.2d 302, 305 (1976)).
138

139
140
141
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erroneous, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict. 142
Applied to Gill, the valuation of Talenti is a finding of fact. Valuation
is an approximation and need only lie within a reasonable range of figures. 143
The Gill valuation, made without a jury, cannot be set aside unless clearly
erroneous based on the record as a whole. 144

2. Questions of Law
Minnesota courts generally review questions of law de novo and
examine how a district court applied the law to stipulated facts. 145 No
deference is given to a lower court on questions of law; 146 however, a
reviewing court must still defer to a district court’s underlying findings of
fact. 147
Applied to Gill, classification of proceeds from Talenti’s sale—
including its earn-out payments—as marital or nonmarital property is a
question of law, reviewed de novo. 148 This differs from the valuation of
Talenti, a finding of fact that is reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. 149

3. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact
Minnesota courts reviewing mixed questions of law and fact “accord
the district court discretion in its ultimate conclusions and review such
conclusions under an abuse of discretion standard.” 150 If it is clear that a
district court improperly applied the law or made findings of fact that are
clearly erroneous and unsupported by the record, an abuse of discretion
has occurred. 151 Applied to Gill, the district court had broad discretion in its
142

Id.

143

Hertz v. Hertz, 304 Minn. 144, 145, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (1975).

144

Id.

Harlow v. State Depʼt of Human Servs., 883 N.W.2d 561, 568 (Minn. 2016).
Modrow v. JP Foodservice, Inc., 656 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Minn. 2003).
Pekarek v. Pekarek, 384 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Minn. Ct. App.1986).
Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997).
Hertz v. Hertz, 304 Minn. 144, 145, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (1975).
In re Estate of Sullivan, 868 N.W.2d 750, 754 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Porch v.
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 642 N.W.2d 473, 477 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)).
In re Marriage of Erickson, No. A10-365, 2010 WL 3958676, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct.
12, 2010); see also Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824) (“Courts are the
mere instruments of the law and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion,
it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed
by law; and, when that is discerned, it is the duty of the court to follow it. Judicial power is
never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the judge, always for the purpose
145
146
147
148
149
150

151
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determination of the appropriate property division. The district court’s
determination cannot be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. 152

4. Contract Interpretation
Contract interpretation and whether language in a contract is
ambiguous is a question of law reviewed de novo. 153 Determining whether a
contract is ambiguous “depends on the meaning assigned to the words and
phrases in accordance with the apparent purpose of the contract as a
whole.” 154 “The language of a contract is ambiguous if it is susceptible to two
or more reasonable interpretations.” 155
If a contract is ambiguous, contract interpretation is a finding of fact.
However, with an unambiguous contract, interpretation is a question of
law. 156 In Gill, the purchase agreement was deemed unambiguous, and its
interpretation was reviewed de novo. 157

5. Statutory Interpretation
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that Minnesota
courts review de novo. 158 The goal when interpreting a statute “is to ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the legislature.” 159 When the language of a
statute is plain and unambiguous, it is assumed to manifest legislative intent
and must be given effect. 160 However, when a statute is silent on a key point
and is subject to different plausible interpretations, the statute must be
considered ambiguous. 161 If a statute is ambiguous, the legislature’s intent
of giving effect to the will of the legislature; or, in other words, to the will of the law.”). For a
discussion of abuse of discretion, see 3 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST APPEAL AND ERROR
§ 12.09 (2019).
In re Marriage of Hart, No. A06-243, 2007 WL 738671, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 13,
2007).
Storms, Inc. v. Mathy Constr. Co., 883 N.W.2d 772, 776 (Minn. 2016); Halla Nursery,
Inc. v. City of Chanhassen, 781 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Minn. 2010).
Halla Nursery, 781 N.W.2d at 884.
Id.
Id. at 304 (quoting Dykes v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 781 N.W.2d 578, 582 (Minn. 2010)) (“When
the [contractual] language is clear and unambiguous, we enforce the agreement of the parties
as expressed in the language of the contract.”).
Storms, Inc., 883 N.W.2d at 776.
Cocchiarella v. Driggs, 884 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 2016); see also Swenson v.
Nickaboine, 793 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. 2011).
MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019).
Tuma v. Commʼr of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn.1986); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 645.16 (2019).
Burkstrand v. Burkstrand, 632 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Minn. 2001).
152

153

154
155
156

157
158

159
160
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may be ascertained by considering a number of factors, including the
legislative history, the necessity for the law, and the consequences of various
interpretations. 162 Additionally, certain presumptions apply, including the
presumption that the legislature does not intend an absurd result. 163
In its effort to obtain a just and equitable division of property, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Gill failed to adhere to these standards.
However, as discussed later, the Gill court could have adhered to these
standards and avoided setting new precedent, all while achieving a just and
equitable division of the Gills’ material assets. 164

B. Examination of the District Court’s Opinion
The district court’s role is to hear disputes and resolve them by making
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 165 In Gill, the district court’s role was
to make a just and equitable distribution of property under the governing
law, sections 518.58 and 518.003 of the Minnesota Statutes.

1. The District Court’s Holding and Reasoning
The first issue the district court addressed was whether the earn-out
payments were marital property accrued during the marriage. 166 To resolve
this, the district court applied section 518.003, subdivision 3b(d), of the
Minnesota Statutes, which defines “nonmarital property” as any property
acquired after the valuation date. 167 Under this oversimplification of the
governing statute, 168 the district court determined that the relevant factor was
confined to the value of Talenti as of the valuation date because the sale of
Talenti occurred after the valuation date and proceeds from that sale were
Stephen’s nonmarital property. 169

162

MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (2019).

163

Id. § 645.17 (2019).
See infra Section IV.D.
See District Courts, MNCOURTS.GOV, http://www.mncourts.gov/mncourtsgov/media/

164
165

CIOMediaLibrary/DocumentLibrary/QF-District-Courts2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/KAA2R4UR].
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and
Decree at 11, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8,
2016).
MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3b (2019).
See infra Section IV.B.2.
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and
Decree at 11, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8,
2016).
166

167
168
169
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On the valuation date, Talenti’s estimated value was $180 million. 170
The district court justified this value through several means. First, it accepted
testimony about the critical nature of the sale’s timing and the sensitive
negotiations between Unilever and Talenti because Unilever was the only
available buyer. 171 Second, the district court found Unilever’s desire to buy
Talenti was based exclusively on its current value, not on any future
projections for growth. 172 Finally, Talenti’s proposed value was deemed fair
because it was similar to prices paid for other comparable companies and
fell within the industry range. 173 For these reasons, the district court held that
Gretchen “received full marital value for Talenti as of the date of
valuation.” 174
Despite the district court’s conclusion of the essential issue of
classification, the district court continued to address other claims as required
by law. 175 The final claim needing attention was Gretchen’s claim that the
earn-out payments were part of Unilever’s scheduled payments to purchase
the parties’ marital ownership in Talenti, not payments for Stephen’s postmarital efforts to grow Talenti after the sale. 176
To address this additional claim, the district court first analyzed the
contract language and determined that the “additional consideration” did
not encompass the earn-out payments for Talenti but rather involved the
promise of opportunity to prove future growth and be rewarded for that
growth. 177 Second, the district court dismissed Talenti’s tax documents that
referred to the sale as an installment sale. 178 Third, the district court pointed

170
171
172
173
174
175

Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 11.
See Gordon Shumaker, Trial Procedures & Practices for Judges, MNBENCHBOOK.ORG

(Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.mnbenchbook.org/index.php?title=AVOIDING_REMAND
[https://perma.cc/CZ3S-QX5K] (“Parties will often assert claims and alternative claims, or
they will raise multiple issues in motions. You must address them all. That does not mean
that you have to decide and explain each issue, but you must do 2 things: Acknowledge each
and [e]ither decide it or state why it is not necessary to reach it or to decide it, or why you
are unable to decide it. Parties who bring appeals often allege that the district court
overlooked an issue that would have changed the outcome of the case and they point to the
fact that the court did not even mention that issue . . . .”).
See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment
and Decree at 11–16, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div.,
Apr. 8, 2016).
Id. at 11.
176

177
178

Id.
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to the uncertainty of obtaining the earn-out payments. 179 Fourth, the district
court determined that the earn-out payments were intended as
compensation for Stephen’s future work at Talenti. 180 And finally, the district
court acknowledged that all members, including passive members, would
receive a share of the earn-out payments proportionate to their ownership,
but the court quickly dismissed this acknowledgment as an unrelated
decision among the DGG members and Unilever. 181
For these reasons, the court held in dictum that “the earn-outs, if
obtained, will be a result of [Stephen’s] significant post-marital labor and
should be awarded to him as his nonmarital property.” 182

2. Errors in the District Court’s Holding and Reasoning
A trial court has broad discretion in evaluating and dividing property
in a marital dissolution and will not be overturned except for abuse of
discretion. 183 The district court’s holding was an abuse of discretion and was
neither just nor equitable.
When the district court made its decision regarding classification of
proceeds from the sale of Talenti, it only used authority from section
518.003, subdivision 3b, Definitions: Marital property; exceptions, of the
Minnesota Statutes. Yet this section explicitly points to section 518.58,
Division of Marital Property, as the dominant authority for making a
division of marital property. 184
Using section 518.58 is critically important because it contains the
essential mandate to make a just and equitable division and provides the
means to do so through obligatory consideration of “all relevant factors.” 185
It also provides that if there is a substantial change in the value of an asset
between the date of valuation and the final distribution, the court may adjust
the valuation of that asset as necessary to effect an equitable distribution; a
179
180
181
182
183

Id. at 14.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
See Sirek v. Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Chamberlain v.

Chamberlain, 615 N.W.2d 405, 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)) (“District courts have broad
discretion over the division of marital property and appellate courts will not alter a district
court’s property division absent a clear abuse of discretion or an erroneous application of
the law.”).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019).
See Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989) (“Effective appellate review of the
exercise of [the trial court’s] discretion is possible only when the trial court has issued
sufficiently detailed findings of fact to demonstrate its consideration of all factors relevant to
[equitable division].”).
184
185
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grant of discretion very pertinent to Gill. 186 The district court’s complete
failure to apply section 518.58 is an abuse of discretion because the district
court made its conclusion without consideration of all the circumstances and
applicable law. 187

3. How the District Court Could Have Strengthened Its Holding and
Reasoning
The district court should have done two things differently to have its
decision upheld on appeal. First, the court should have carefully and
methodically used all the governing law to reach its conclusion. Section
518.58 and section 518.003, subdivision 3b, are companion statutes,
intended to be applied in tandem when making a division of marital
property. 188 Second, as an extension to the prior suggestion, the court should
have exercised the discretion afforded by section 518.58, subdivision 1—the
discretion to change a property’s value post-valuation date—because the facts
showed a substantial change in Talenti’s value post-valuation date. 189
Discretion, when given, must be exercised. 190 Exercising discretion
means that the court has deliberately considered all relevant factors and
186
187

Id.
See Shumaker, supra note 175 (“When a statute or rule requires that you make findings

as to various elements, do so, and be sure to cover all of the essential elements. . . . [A]void
remands by making it clear that you have done everything the law requires you to do in
resolving an issue or a case.”). Judges often make decisions on the fly and rely on attorneys’
legal support for their position. While a judge should be able to rely on attorneys to bring
the most relevant cases and law to the judge’s attention, it is ultimately up to the judge to get
it right. Judge Mel Dickstein, How Judges Make Decisions, MINNPOST (Sept. 9, 2014),
https://www.minnpost.com/community-voices/2014/09/how-judges-make-decisions/
[https://perma.cc/937Q-S2P4]. In Gill, none of the attorneys raised their claims in light of
pertinent case law and section 518.58 of the Minnesota Statutes. See generally Brief for
Appellant, Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (2018) (No. A16-1421), 2017 WL 2210733;
Respondent’s Brief and Addendum, Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (2018) (No. A16-1421),
2018 WL 2283065; Appellant’s Reply Brief, Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (2018) (No. A161421), 2018 WL 2283066; Brief for Respondent, Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (2018) (No.
A16-1421), 2017 WL 2210734; Proposed Second Partial Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Family Ct. Div., Mar.
18, 2016).
MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3b (2019) (“‘Marital propertyʼ means property . . .
acquired by the parties . . . prior to the date of valuation under section 518.58, subdivision
1.”).
Id.
See State v. Grover, No. A16-1565, 2017 WL 3469449, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 14,
2017) (“[I]f the district court has discretion . . . it must exercise that discretion by deliberately
considering circumstances for and against . . . . When the record demonstrates that an
exercise of discretion has not occurred, the case must be remanded . . . .”).
188

189
190
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based its decision upon them. 191 In Gill, the court did not exercise the
obligatory discretion, primarily because it did not apply the law that
mandated discretion.
To properly exercise discretion, the district court should have
considered the substantial change in Talenti’s value between the valuation
date and the final distribution. 192 Exercising this discretion does not mean
the court was obliged to adjust Talenti’s value, only that it needed to
consider the change in value to effect an equitable distribution. 193
Instead, the district court applied an inflexible standard based solely
upon section 518.003, subdivision 3b, that merely defines nonmarital
property as property acquired by a spouse after the valuation date. 194 If the
district court had properly applied section 518.58, there would likely be no
basis to conclude that it abused its discretion.
It is not clear whether the district court thought it made a just and
equitable division of the Gill’s property, but it does appear that it felt
constrained to follow the law. 195 The district court reached the only outcome
possible through inflexible application of section 518.003, subdivision 3b,
that proceeds from the sale of Talenti are nonmarital property because they
were acquired after the valuation date. 196 Use of section 518.58 would have
been liberating by allowing the district court to consider all relevant factors
to make a truly just and equitable division.
Had the district court applied the relevant law and exercised discretion
where required, the court would have presented a stronger case and its
decision would likely have been affirmed upon review by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals.

C. Examination of the Court of Appeals’ Opinion
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has the authority to review decisions
of the district court, but it is limited by established standards of review that
prescribe the level of scrutiny it must apply. 197 This was the Minnesota Court
of Appeals’ challenge in Gill—to operate within established standards of
review but still find a way to reverse the district court’s judgment, which the
Minnesota Court of Appeals considered unjust and inequitable. 198
191

Id.

192

Gill v. Gill, 900 N.W.2d 717, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).

193

See Grover, 2017 WL 3469449, at *2.

194

MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3b (2019).

195

See MNCOURTS.GOV, supra note 165.

196

Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 304 (Minn. 2018).

197

See supra Section IV.A.

198

Gill v. Gill, 900 N.W.2d 717, 722 (Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
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1. The Court of Appeals’ Reasoning and Holding
The Minnesota Court of Appeals did not address the district court’s
essential holding—whether the earn-out payments were marital property
accrued during the marriage before the valuation date. 199 Rather, it
addressed the district court’s obiter dictum—whether “earn-out payments
from the sale of a marital interest in a company are husband’s nonmarital
property by virtue of his having worked for the purchaser during the earnout period under a separate employment agreement.” 200 The Minnesota
Court of Appeals determined this to be a classification issue, subject to de
novo review. 201
To add to the confusion, the Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded
that the amount Unilever paid for Talenti reflected the value of the company
at the valuation date. 202 Therefore, the question the court answered was not
the one it asked—whether the earn-out payments were marital property. The
question it answered was how much Unilever agreed to pay. 203 Valuation,
however, is a question of fact to be reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard. 204
To resolve this conundrum, the Minnesota Court of Appeals focused
on interpretation of the purchase agreement and concluded that the contract
was unambiguous based on its perceived plain meaning. 205 Under this
finding, the Minnesota Court of Appeals found that the plain meaning of
the purchase agreement clearly identified the upfront payment and future
earn-out payments as “consideration” for Talenti’s purchase, with an agreed
upon formula for calculating the earn-out payments. 206 Further, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals found the earn-out payments were not
compensation for Stephen’s post-sale efforts because he was compensated
through a separate employment agreement. 207 Additionally, the purchase
agreement specified that all members of DGG would receive an equitable
share of the earn-out payments, regardless of whether they worked for

199
200

See Shumaker, supra note 175 and accompanying text.
Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 719.

201

Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1997).

202

Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 720.
Id.

203

“There is caselaw authority that the mislabeling of a finding of fact as a conclusion of law,
or vice versa, is not determinative of the true nature of the item.” Dailey v. Chermak, 709
N.W.2d 626, 631 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Graphic Arts Educ. Found., Inc. v. State,
240 Minn. 143, 145–46, 59 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1953)).
Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 721.
Id. at 720.
Id. at 722.

204

205
206
207
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Talenti at the time of sale or continued working for Talenti in the future. 208
This significantly undercut the district court’s conclusion that earn-outs were
nonmarital property earned by Stephen as compensations for his services.
The court also found that because the earn-out payments were part of the
purchase price, they reflected Talenti’s value as of the valuation date.
For these reasons, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the earnout payments were marital property and remanded the case back to the
district court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 209

2. Errors in the Court of Appeals’ Reasoning and Holding
Unlike the district court’s judgment, the Minnesota Court of Appeals’
judgment produced a just and equitable result: Gretchen received her fair
share of Talenti’s sale proceeds. But like the district court, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals’ judgment did not comport with the law. There are three
errors committed by the Minnesota Court of Appeals.
First, the Minnesota Court of Appeals erroneously only reviewed the
part of the district court’s decision that was obiter dictum. 210 Thus, even
though the court came to a different conclusion from the district court and
held that the earn-out payments were marital property, the holding was not
based on a review of the district court’s central holding: whether the right to
the earn-out payments was marital property accrued during the marriage. 211
Unlike the district court, when the Minnesota Court of Appeals set out to
determine whether Gretchen received a just and equitable distribution, it
focused primarily on how much Unilever agreed to pay. 212 Whereas, when
Id. at 719. Some of Talentiʼs current leadership team would not be continuing
employment with Unilever. For example, Dean Phillips would be leaving the company to
care for his daughter who was battling cancer, yet, would still receive a portion of earn-outs
prorated according to his ownership interest in DGG. Amended Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and Decree at 16, Gill v. Gill, No.
27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8, 2016).
Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 722.
See supra notes 175–182 and accompanying text. For an in-depth discussion of dicta, see
generally Judith M. Stinson, Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why it Matters, 76
BROOKLYN L. REV. 219 (2010), https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1217&context=blr [https://perma.cc/KRT7-74G2]. “To the extent that courts treat
dicta as holding, they are more likely to reach incorrect decisions, to exceed their judicial
authority, and to generate illegitimate results.” Id. at 221. This is precisely what happened in
Gill when the Minnesota Court of Appeals focused solely on the district court’s dicta to reach
a different conclusion.
Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and
Decree at 11, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8,
2016).
Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 720.
208

209
210

211

212
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the district court set out to determine whether Gretchen received a just and
equitable distribution, it focused primarily on how much Talenti was worth
on the valuation date. 213 This revision of the issue changed the nature of the
case from a question of classification to a question of valuation and contract
interpretation.
Second, the Minnesota Court of Appeals improperly determined that
proceeds from the sale of Talenti were marital property. 214 This was
improper because the sale occurred after the valuation date, and the
governing statute clearly states that “‘Nonmarital property’ means property
real or personal, acquired by either spouse before, during, or after the
existence of their marriage, which . . . is acquired by a spouse after the
valuation date.” 215 The only way to circumvent the timing of Talenti’s sale
after the valuation date was through the use of judicial discretion—afforded
by the statute—to adjust the valuation, which the court did not use. 216
Third, like the district court, the Minnesota Court of Appeals did not
apply all the governing law. 217 The court of appeals only referenced the
governing statutes once to conclude that the parties’ ownership of Talenti
was presumptively marital property. 218 The court did not address the
directive in section 518.003, subdivision 3b, that property acquired after the
valuation date is nonmarital property, nor did the court apply any of the
discretionary factors afforded in section 518.58 to ensure a just and
equitable division. Instead, the court awarded Gretchen a share of the earnout payments in a willy-nilly fashion without proper reference to governing
law.
These three errors led to an inadequate resolution and left the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ holding open to further review by the
Minnesota Supreme Court.

Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and
Decree at 11, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr. 8,
2016).
Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 722.
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019).
Id. (“If there is a substantial change in value of an asset between the date of valuation and
the final distribution, the court may adjust the valuation of that asset as necessary to effect an
equitable distribution.”).
See supra Section IV.B.2.
Gill, 900 N.W.2d at 720; see also MINN. STAT. § 518.003, subdiv. 3b (2019).

213
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3. How the Court of Appeals Could Have Strengthened Its Holding
The court of appeals’ short opinion and disregard of applicable law
may have been, in effect, a punt to the supreme court. 219 However, if its punt
was unintentional, the court could have strengthened its opinion to comport
with the law and avoid further review in three ways.
First, the Minnesota Court of Appeals should have focused its analysis
on the district court’s arbitrary and capricious application of the law—its
complete failure to apply section 518.58—and found that the district court
abused its discretion. 220 Only after the Minnesota Court of Appeals
established that the district court abused its discretion, could it overrule the
district court’s finding of fact, Talenti’s valuation, because it was clearly
erroneous. 221 The valuation was clearly erroneous because the district court
did not consider all the relevant factors, i.e. the timing of Talenti’s sale or
the letter of intent that was signed before the valuation date and substantially
mirrored the purchase agreement, or exercise its discretion to adjust
Talenti’s value based on these relevant factors.
Second, although the Minnesota Court of Appeals’ de novo
interpretation of the contract to determine whether the earn-out payments
were part of the sales proceeds was critical to the final analysis, it was only
necessary and proper as a means to determine Talenti’s value—not as a
means to determine whether Talenti’s proceeds were marital property. 222
The question of whether Talenti’s proceeds were marital property should
have been determined through the use of judicial discretion afforded by the
governing statutes, not through contract interpretation.
Finally, the Minnesota Court of Appeals could have written its opinion
more precisely to address the subtle nuances between classification and
valuation that have continually caused errors throughout the course of
litigation. If the Minnesota Court of Appeals had done these three things,
the Minnesota Supreme Court could have easily affirmed the Minnesota
Court of Appeals’ decision without establishing new precedent.
Minnesota Judicial Branch, Minnesota Court of Appeals, MNCOURTS.GOV
http://www.mncourts.gov/courtofappeals.aspx [https://perma.cc/9R83-9M5Q] (“As the
error-correcting court, the Court of Appeals handles most of the appeals, which allows the
Minnesota Supreme Court to spend time resolving difficult constitutional and public policy
cases. Court of Appeals’ decisions are the final ruling in about ninety-five percent of the
2,000 to 2,400 appeals every year. Typically, about five percent of the Court’s decisions are
accepted by the Minnesota Supreme Court for further review.”).
See supra Section IV.B.2.
Sirek v. Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 898 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
See supra Section IV.B.2 for a discussion of how the court of appeals improperly based
its review solely on the district court’s dicta rather than the district court’s essential holding.
219

220
221
222
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D. Examination of the Supreme Court’s Opinion
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s challenge was to affirm the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ just and equitable holding while reconciling
the holding to comport with the law. To do so, the court properly returned
to the district court’s essential issue: whether proceeds from Talenti’s sale,
including future contingent earn-out payments, were marital or nonmarital
property. 223

1. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning and Holding
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s analysis was much more in depth
than the Minnesota Court of Appeals’, as it tried to reconcile the just and
equitable outcome of the court of appeals’ contract interpretation with the
district court’s rigid adherence to the valuation date. It attempted this
reconciliation through a multi-step process. First, the court established that
ownership of Talenti was a marital asset. 224 Next, the court substituted the
contractual rights from Talenti’s sale to stand in the place of the marital
asset. 225 Finally, the court determined the scope of the contractual right—
whether the earn-out payments were part of the sale price—and concluded
that the earn-out payments were marital property. 226

a. Standards of Review
The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged all the proper standards
of review—an important step to create a solid foundation for its decision. 227
The court determined that: (1) whether property is marital or nonmarital is
a question of law reviewed de novo; (2) unambiguous contracts are
interpreted de novo; (3) deference must be given to the district court’s
findings of fact, which cannot be set aside unless clearly erroneous; (4) a
district court’s evaluation and division of property cannot be overturned
unless the court abused its discretion; and (5) if the reviewing court is left
with the clear and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, then the
Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 298 (Minn. 2018).
Id. (“[T]he parties’ interest in the company was marital property that was acquired before
the valuation date . . . .”).
Id. at 304 (“Because Wyndmere received a contractual right to receive the earn-out
payments from the pre-dissolution sale of a marital asset that was acquired before the
valuation date, we conclude that the earn-out payments, as direct proceeds from the sale, are
marital property subject to the court's valuation and equitable division.”).
Id. (“To determine the scope of the contractual rights that Wyndmere received from the
sale of the parties’ marital asset, we look to the sale's purchase agreement.”).
See MNCOURTS.GOV, supra note 219.
223
224

225

226

227
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district court’s decision can be found to be clearly erroneous,
notwithstanding the existence of evidence to support such findings. 228

b. Statutory Application
The Minnesota Supreme Court referenced both applicable statutes—
sections 518.003 and 518.58. 229
Within section 518.003, subdivision 3b, the Minnesota Supreme
Court emphasized that all property acquired subsequent to the marriage and
before the valuation date is presumed to be marital property, regardless of
whether title is held individually or by both spouses; that each spouse has a
common ownership in marital property that vests no later than the time of
the entry of the decree in a proceeding for dissolution; and that nonmarital
property is property acquired by a spouse after the valuation date. 230
Within section 518.58, the Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized the
statute’s mandate that the court make a just and equitable distribution of
marital property. 231 Additionally, the court reasoned that the judicial
discretion, afforded in section 518.58, subdivision 3, to force the sale of
marital property for equitable purposes, could reasonably be expanded to
include a consensual sale. As such, the sale proceeds would be marital
property. 232

c. Contractual Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court used Minnesota precedent to cement
both its expansive interpretation of marital property that upheld the
legislature’s intent to incorporate the contributions of both spouses 233 and its
narrow interpretation of nonmarital property to reinforce the limited
exceptions as exclusive of all other exceptions. 234
After grounding its decision in statutory authority and case law, the
Minnesota Supreme Court made its critical and distinctive observation—
whether property is classified as marital depends on when it was acquired. 235
228

Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301–03.

229

MINN. STAT. §§ 518.003, subdiv. 3b, 518.58, (2019).

230

Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 302.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id. at 302–03; see also Baker v. Baker, 753 N.W.2d 644, 650 (Minn. 2008); Nardini v.

231
232
233

Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 192 (Minn. 1987).
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 302–03; see also MINN. STAT. § 645.19 (2019) (“Exceptions expressed
in a law shall be construed to exclude all other.”); Janssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752, 755
(Minn. 1983).
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 303.
234

235
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The court maintained that the earn-out payments were not acquired, but
received, in exchange for already-acquired marital property. 236 As an
exchange, the sale converted the parties’ marital asset from an indirect
membership interest in Talenti into a contractual right to receive proceeds
from its sale. 237
After establishing that the contractual rights in the sales proceeds were
marital property received through exchange, the court proceeded to analyze
whether earn-out payments were included within the scope of those
contractual rights. 238 Like the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota
Supreme Court interpreted the contractual language de novo. 239 The
unambiguous language of the purchase agreement provided that all DGG
members would receive a right to a proportional share of the earn-out
payments. 240 Further, the plain language indicated that the earn-out
payments are consideration for the sale, not compensation for Stephen’s
future work. 241
In tandem with its contract interpretation, the Minnesota Supreme
Court cited section 518.58, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes to
establish that the court must base its equitable division “on all relevant
factors.” 242 It determined a relevant factor was the right conferred on all
DGG members regardless of any post-sale efforts. 243 Thus, equity required
Gretchen to receive a portion of the earn-out payments based on her prorata share of DGG.
Through this analysis, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ decision and held:
[B]ecause the parties’ interest in the company was marital property that
was acquired before the valuation date, the consideration of the company,
which occurred before the dissolution and included an amount paid at the
time of the sale and a contractual right to receive future amounts, is also
marital property. 244
Id. It must be noted, however, that the court’s substitution of “exchanged” for “acquired”
comes confusingly close to the definition of nonmarital property in section 518.003,
subdivision 3b, of the Minnesota Statutes. Section 518.003 describes nonmarital property as
property acquired by either spouse which is “in exchange for or is the increase in value of
property which is described in clauses (a), (b), (d), and (e).” Clause (d) refers to property
acquired by a spouse after the valuation date.
Id. at 304.
236

237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

Id.
Id. at 304–05.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Id. at 297.
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2. Errors in the Supreme Court’s Reasoning and Holding
The Minnesota Supreme Court reached a just and equitable outcome
but ignored existing precedent and statutory language to obtain its result and
created new precedent that is both unnecessary and overreaching. 245 In
reaching its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court made three creative,
but erroneous, uses of the law. 246
First, even though the court did a better job of setting out statutory
authority for its decision, it still missed the mark by ignoring the valuation
date like the district court. 247 To counter this, the Minnesota Supreme Court
made the semantic, but material, switch from “acquired” to “exchanged”
and created a distinction that would allow the substitution of a contractual
right for a marital asset. 248 Regardless of semantics, the contractual right to
receive the earn-out payments still came after the valuation date. 249 Yet, the
Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the earn-out payments were for
the sale of marital property, which made the timing irrelevant. 250 The only
legitimate way to subvert the fact that Talenti’s sale occurred after the
valuation date was through the exercise of judicial discretion, which would
allow the court to adjust the value of the asset as necessary after the valuation
date to achieve a just and equitable outcome. 251
Second, the Minnesota Supreme Court erroneously relied on the
provision in section 518.003 that states, “[E]ach spouse has a common
ownership in marital property that vests not later than the time of the entry
of the decree in a proceeding for dissolution.” 252 While this is a worthy
reference to one of the governing statutes, this provision of section 518.003
does not help resolve the classification of the sales as either marital or
nonmarital property. The court likely referenced this provision to show that
property can be divided up until the day of dissolution. While this is true,
the legislature’s intent for this 1982 amendment was to clarify that divisions
of marital property are not taxable events, not to justify ignoring the
valuation date. 253
Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2019) (The Minnesota Supreme Court’s goal should be “to ascertain
and effectuate the intention of the legislature.”).
See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301–08.
MINN. STAT. §§ 518.58, subdiv. 1, 518.003, subdiv. 3b(d); see also supra Section IV.B.2.
See supra Section IV.D.1.
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 304.
245

246
247
248
249
250

Id.

251

MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019).

252

Id.

253

The Minnesota Supreme Court has distinguished the 1982 amendment, stating:
The intent of the legislature in enacting this act is to confirm, clarify, and ratify
legislative intent embodied in prior and existing state law, and state law as
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Third, during the pendency of a dissolution proceeding, the governing
law allows the court to preserve the parties’ marital assets through a courtordered sale of those marital assets and provide for the distribution of the
funds received. 254 The Minnesota Supreme Court erroneously inferred that
proceeds from a consensual sale of marital property are no different than
proceeds from a court-ordered sale of marital property. 255 While the
governing statute allows for a court-ordered sale of marital property, it is
silent on the matter of a consensual sale of marital property. 256 Regardless of
the statute’s meaning, the court’s inference is flawed because the problem—
that Talenti’s proceeds were never marital property under the strictures of
the law—remains. The proceeds were nonmarital property acquired after
the valuation date. 257 The only way the court could have incorporated the
value of Talenti’s proceeds into the pre-sale valuation was by exercising its
discretion and adjusting Talenti’s value when the value significantly
increased shortly after the valuation date. 258
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s creative, but faulty analysis, led to
new precedent. 259 Justice Anderson’s dissent rightly pointed out that the
majority’s reasoning called for “considerable legal gymnastics,” which not
only ignored the district court’s valuation date, but also rewrote the statutory

amended by this act, that the division or disposition of marital property caused
by or incident to a decree of dissolution or annulment is not a sale, exchange,
transfer, or disposition of or a dealing in property but is a division of a common
ownership by spouses in property for purposes of the property laws of this state
and for purposes of the United States and Minnesota income tax laws.
Miller v. Miller, 352 N.W.2d 738, 743 (Minn. 1984) (quoting 1982 MINN. LAWS, ch. 464, §
3).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 3(a).
Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 303–04 (Minn. 2018) (“We see no reason to treat the
proceeds of a consensual sale of marital property differently from the proceeds of a courtordered sale of marital property.”).
See MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 3(a). If a statute is ambiguous, the court may ascertain
the legislature’s intent by considering several matters, including the legislative history, the
necessity for the law, and the consequences of various interpretations. MINN. STAT. § 645.16
(2019).
According to section 518.58, subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes, “‘Nonmarital
property’ means property real or personal, acquired by either spouse before, during, or after
the existence of their marriage, which . . . (d) is acquired by a spouse after the valuation date.”
Here, the proceeds from the sale of Talenti were acquired after the valuation date. Gill, 919
N.W.2d at 301.
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 311 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv.
1 (2018)).
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definition of marital property. 260 The majority did not merely apply the
existing statutes, it additionally “adopted a new hard and fast extra-textual
rule—that all proceeds from the sale of marital property before dissolution
constitute marital property as a matter of law—regardless of whether this
produces an equitable result.” 261

3. Justifications for the Supreme Court’s Reasoning and Holding
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding did not fully comport with
law, but it was just and equitable by allowing Gretchen to receive a
proportionate share of the proceeds that she had only been denied because
of strategic corporate timing. 262 Three justifications provided by the
Minnesota Supreme Court firmly supported its conclusion. 263
First, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that it did not need to
defer to the district court’s purported findings of fact and could interpret the
contract de novo as a question of law. 264 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s
subsequent interpretation conformed with the common usage of earn-out
payments in business acquisitions. 265 It is not unusual for a sale to use earnout payments as a way to defer payment, especially when the parties cannot
come to an agreement on a fair purchase price. 266 Additionally, earn-out
payments are a way to bridge the gap between a company’s current value
and its unrealized potential value and can provide incentives for key
leadership to remain active in the company post sale. 267 These common
usages resonate with Gill, solidifying the Minnesota Supreme Court’s

Id. at 308. Although Justice Anderson’s dissent rightly points out the flaws in the majorityʼs
holding, its own analysis is flawed as well because it mimicked the district courtʼs analysis and
would not produce a just and equitable division of property.
Id. at 311.
See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment
and Decree at 12, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Fam. Ct. Div., Apr.
8, 2016).
See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 301–08.
Id. at 307 (citation omitted) (“We need not defer to the district courtʼs purported findings
of fact because they are instead conclusions of law based on the district courtʼs interpretation
of the purchase agreement.”).
Id. at 300 (quoting the purchase agreement that stated, “As additional consideration for
the Assets, the Company shall also be eligible to receive from Asset Buyer (i) an amount
equal to the First Earn-out Payment . . . and (ii) an amount equal to the Second Earn-out
Payment . . . .”).
Kimberly S. Blanchard, The Tax Man Cometh: Handling Earn-outs in Business
Acquisitions, 6 BUS. L. TODAY 59, 61 (1997).
Id. at 60.
260
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determination that the earn-out payments were not intended as
compensation for Stephen’s future work. 268
Second, Stephen signed an employment agreement compensating him
$738,125 to continue his employment at Talenti for two years. 269 The
amount was similar to the amount Stephen was already earning at Talenti—
approximately $350,000 annually. 270 Stephen’s claim that the earn-out
payments were compensation for his continued employment is illogical
because he would receive an additional $5.6 million for two years of work
in addition to his contracted compensation—a total compensation
astronomically beyond anything he ever received working at Talenti before
the sale. 271
Third, the purchase agreement specified that all members, including
passive members, would receive a portion of the earn-out payments,
regardless of any future work with the company. 272 This provision directly
contradicted Stephen’s claim that the earn-out payments were
compensation for his future work. 273 Moreover, it is not logical, fair, or just
for Gretchen to be the only non-working member precluded from receiving
a share of the earn-out payments. 274
Despite the justifications behind the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
holding, it was not enough to avoid creating new precedent.

4. How the Supreme Court Could Have Achieved Its Desired
Outcome Without Setting New Precedent
Creating new precedent that usurped the legislature’s authority was
unnecessary. Like the Minnesota Court of Appeals, the Minnesota
Supreme Court should have explicitly pointed out the district court’s abuse

268
269

See Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 306.
Id. at 300.

Brief and Addendum for Respondent at 14, Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297 (2018) (No.
A16-1421), 2018 WL 2283065, at *40.
Id. at 14.
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 300 (quoting the purchase agreement language that stated,
“[I]mmediately following the consummation of the Asset Purchase, [David Goliath] shall
effect a distribution to the Members of (a) the Asset Purchase Payment and (b) the right to
receive (i) an amount equal to the First Earn-out Payment . . . and (ii) an amount equal to
the Second Earn-out Payment.”).
Id. at 306 (relating Stephenʼs attempt to overcome the presumption that Gretchen is
entitled to an equitable distribution of the earn-out payments by arguing that the earn-out
payments are nonmarital property that he acquired “after the valuation date” as
compensation for his post-marital labor).
Id. at 300, 307.
270

271
272

273

274

2020]

CASE NOTE: GILL V. GILL

881

of discretion for its failure to apply the governing law. 275 Once the Minnesota
Supreme Court established the district court’s abuse of discretion, the court
should have applied all of the governing statutes and presented a clear
analysis of the law’s pertinence to its holding. 276 It should have exercised the
judicial discretion afforded in the statute and considered all relevant
factors: 277 the pre-valuation knowledge of Talenti’s impending sale, the letter
of intent detailing the sale’s economic agreement, the letter of intent’s
consistency with the final purchase agreement, and the timing of the sale
relative to the valuation and dissolution date. 278 These relevant factors
created the ideal case for using the afforded discretion to adjust the value of
Talenti because the value had substantially changed between the date of
valuation and the date of dissolution. 279 As such, the Minnesota Supreme
Court could have recognized the earn-out payments as part of the value of
Talenti and adjusted Gretchen’s award after the valuation date as permitted
by section 518.58. 280
Yet, the court ignored the language of the statute providing for judicial
discretion to achieve a just and equitable result and instead focused solely
on the classification of the earn-out payments while disregarding the
valuation date. 281 This created new precedent that was unnecessary.

E. Potential Future Consequences
In Minnesota, the law governing property distribution in a marriage
dissolution was purposely crafted to eliminate gender bias and generate
certainty through an established valuation date while still affording a high
degree of judicial flexibility to render a just and equitable distribution. 282 By
setting the default valuation date at a prehearing conference, parties were
protected from events both within and beyond their control. 283
Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in an effort to fix the
lower courts’ decisions and follow established standards of review, ignored
the legislature’s purposeful balancing. By doing so, the supreme court
275
276

See supra Section IV.B.3.
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 310 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is no need to create a new

timeframe for classifying proceeds where the district court already has discretion to change
the valuation date if the court finds that ‘another date of valuation is fair and equitable.’”).
See supra Section IV.C.2.
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 298.
Id. at 311 (Anderson, J., dissenting) (citing MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2018)).
See MINN. STAT. § 518.58.
Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 304.
See supra Part II.
See Judkins, supra note 72 at 474–75 (“Early valuation . . . also delivers certainty for pretrial settlement negotiations based upon accurate financial data.”).
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280
281
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adopted an inflexible new rule: that all proceeds from the sale of marital
property before dissolution constitute marital property as a matter of law. 284
While the supreme court decision may have solved one problem—that of
fairly distributing earn-out payments to Gretchen Gill—it may have created
others.
One possible consequence is that Gill’s new hard and fast rule may
affirmatively eliminate the judicial discretion necessary to fairly evaluate the
unique circumstances and needs of each party. As the dissent points out:
Under Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1, the district court has discretion
to ‘adjust the valuation’ of a marital asset to reflect any ‘substantial change’
in the value of the asset after the valuation date in order ‘to effect an
equitable distribution’ of the asset, as well as discretion to ‘make a just and
equitable division of the marital property’ between the parties. Thus, the
court is not ‘merely applying the existing statutes,’ as it contends; rather, the
court is adopting a new hard and fast extra-textual rule—that all proceeds
from the sale of marital property before dissolution constitute marital
property as a matter of law—regardless of whether this produces an equitable
result.” 285
For example, would the supreme court’s hard and fast rule be fair and
equitable if Gretchen had consistently opposed and obstructed the sale of
Talenti prior to her divorce? Likely not. Would the supreme court’s hard
and fast rule be fair and equitable if a spouse purposely neglected or
disdained a property prior to the valuation date, only to show sudden
interest if the property is sold before the final dissolution for a significant
increase in value due solely to the efforts of the other spouse? Again, likely
not. Yet, the Minnesota Supreme Court’s new precedent could lead to these
absurd outcomes if taken to its logical extreme, which outcome is often the
result of denying the judge any substantial measure of discretion. 286
Moreover, Gill’s attempt at a strict rule to create certainty could actually
create uncertainty. If marital property is distributed upon the valuation date
but remains subject to potential redistribution if sold before final
dissolution, certainty is diminished. An asset’s value has the potential to
increase tremendously within that period. 287 Yet, a party would be
disincentivized from maximizing that potential for fear of redistribution.
284
285

Gill, 919 N.W.2d at 298.
Id. at 311 (Anderson, J., dissenting).

JOHN SASSOON, ANCIENT LAWS & MODERN PROBLEMS: THE BALANCE BETWEEN
JUSTICE AND A LEGAL SYSTEM 203 (Intellect Books Reprint ed. 2005).
Judkins, supra note 72, at 474 (“One must also caution practitioners about the effect of
early valuation dates on increases in marital assets, like stock plans, securities, or business
partnerships. Property value may rise . . . . ”).
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This is exactly why the legislature provided judicial discretion—so that judges
can use their common sense to obtain a just and equitable distribution in
each individual circumstance. 288
An additional possible consequence is the re-introduction of gender
and role-based disparities due to the elimination of judicial discretion. By
not exercising its judicial discretion and, instead, focusing on whether
property is marital or non-marital, the Minnesota Supreme Court
undermined the strength of the court’s judicial discretion to maintain gender
equality.
For example, a potential byproduct of the homemaker’s sacrifice to
stay home is a lack of in-depth knowledge regarding the working spouse’s
business or career. This can spill over into divorce proceedings and result
in an unfair and inequitable distribution of property. In Gill, Gretchen did
not have a firm knowledge of Talenti’s worth, nor did she have a place at
the negotiation table or a say in the sale’s timing. 289 This put her at a
disadvantage when the time came to value and distribute assets. Yet, there
is no doubt that Gretchen’s role as a homemaker contributed invaluably to
her husband’s business success and that she deserved an equitable portion
of Talenti’s proceeds. 290 Exercise of the court’s discretion was imperative to
remedy this imbalance.
Although the new rule worked out favorably for Gretchen, in the
future, Gill could facilitate planning to game the system and cheat the less
knowledgeable spouse out of their fair share of assets. For example, earnout payments, which used to favor the seller, could be couched as
compensation to avoid the consequences of division, which are likely to be
greater than the additional tax penalties. 291
Thomas A. Zonay, Judicial Discretion: Ten Guidelines for Its Use, THE NATIONAL
JUDICIAL COLLEGE: THE JUDICIAL EDGE (MAY 25, 2015), https://www.judges.org/judicialdiscretion-ten-guidelines-for-its-use/ [https://perma.cc/3XR4-CQ4Z].
See Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment
and Decree at 9–13, Gill v. Gill, No. 27-FA-14-5356 (Minn. 4th Jud. Dist. Family Ct. Div.,
Apr. 8, 2016).
The court conclusively presumes that each spouse made a substantial contribution to the
acquisition of income and property while they were living together as husband and wife.
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019). Nowhere in the court proceedings did Stephen
refute this “conclusive presumption.”
See Blanchard, supra note 266 (“An individual seller will ordinarily want to avoid having
the earn-out be taxed as compensation . . . [because] she will be subject to federal income
tax on ordinary income at rates up to 39.6 percent, whereas the maximum rate of tax on
long-term capital gain is only 28 percent. In addition, compensation for services is subject to
FICA or SECA taxes, including the 2.9 percent health insurance tax with no cap. The buyerʼs
tax interest may be diametrically opposed to that of the seller. A buyer seeking to maximize
its tax position will ordinarily prefer to have the earn-out treated as compensation for services,
288
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These potential consequences might have been avoided by a close
reading and application of the governing statutes that provided ample
flexibility and certainty to reach the same outcome—fairly awarding
Gretchen Gill an equitable share of the earn-out payments from Talenti’s
sale.

F. Potential Statutory Revisions to Increase Clarity
Going forward, the legislature may have to amend one of the last
remaining vestiges of noncompulsory judicial discretion in the statutes
governing property distribution in marriage dissolutions. Section 518.58,
subdivision 1, of the Minnesota Statutes currently reads, “If there is a
substantial change in value of an asset between the date of valuation and the
final distribution, the court may adjust the valuation of that asset as necessary
to effect an equitable distribution.” 292 Perhaps the “may” should become
another “shall,” just as the rest of the statute reads. Though it would not
really change the requirement to exercise discretion by considering all
competing factors and adjusting an asset’s valuation as needed for a just and
equitable result, it would eliminate confusion about what it means to
exercise discretion. 293
Additionally, a more stringent and clear emphasis within subdivision
3b of section 518.003, and section 518.58, to use both sections in tandem
could prevent a similar outcome in the future. 294 Had these changes been
implemented, the outcome could have been different at each stage of the
Gill litigation. The parties could have saved time and resources, and the
court could have avoided setting new precedent.
V. CONCLUSION
Over a span of fifty years, the Minnesota legislature carefully wrote
and amended the statutes governing the division of marital property in a
marriage dissolution to bring about a just and equitable division. 295 In Gill,
the judiciary brought about a regression by adopting a new rule that dictates
all pre-dissolution proceeds from the sale of marital property—without
regard to the valuation date—are marital property as a matter of law. 296
because payment of compensation will usually generate a current tax deduction for the buyer.
If the buyer is a corporation, the value of the tax deduction may be as high as 35 percent of
the amount paid.”).
MINN. STAT. § 518.58, subdiv. 1 (2019) (emphasis added).
See State v. Grover, No. A16-1565, 2017 WL 3469449, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 14,
2017).
See MINN. STAT. §§ 518.003, subdiv. 3b, 518.58.
See supra Part II.
Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 312 n.4 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
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This new court-made rule is undesirable because it takes away the
flexibility and certainty of the statute, while proliferating gender- and rolebased disparities. It is also unnecessary because it could have been avoided
at each stage of litigation if the courts had carefully assessed and applied the
appropriate standard of review and the governing statutes. One way to avoid
future repercussions of the courts’ errors is through amendment of the
statutes to require a court’s use of its discretion when evaluating a substantial
change in an asset’s value and an increased emphasis to apply the statutes in
tandem.
Luckily for Gretchen Gill, the court reached the right outcome, even
if it relied on faulty reasoning to get there. 297

297

See id. at 301–08.
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